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FOUR FACTORS ARE IN FORCE PANDEMIC JOINTS 
TO INITIATE AN ILLICIT DUAL USE TECHNOLOGIES 
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The transfer of high-tech technologies for Ukraine over the years of its independence and 
nowadays is one of the key factors in stabilizing a development of strategic industries (defense-in-
dustrial complex, aviation, rocket-space engineering, etc.). A concept for implementation of state 
policy on import substitution and diversification of imports of supplies of goods for the needs of 
strategic industries, developed by the Cabinet of Ministers (Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, Res-
olution N471 of June 12, 2020) [1], outlines the ways to resolve traditional problems of transfer of 
dual-use technologies and strategic goods.
The need to resolve this issue at the external state level is caused by a specificity of evolution 
of political and mental factors affecting the transfer of technologies in transition period from the 
totalitarian regime of the former Soviet Union to an economically difficult format of the Union of 
Independent States (CIS). The factors influencing the transfer of technology, whether it is simply 





A B S T R A C T
An objective of this effort is a quick recap to assess the underpin barriers of transfer of 
technologies appeared in Ukraine after acquiring the Independence and those developed of 
today and to highlight and evaluate an impact of political, historical, mental and other factors 
affecting the science and as a consequence leakage of technologies abroad. Of importance is 
also a question if a current COVID-19 pandemic will join these factors if it initiates an illicit 
transfer of dual use (DU) technologies from Ukraine as it was in 1990s and how it affects 
an efficient and proper functioning and optimization of transfer of technologies process, and 
that is quite a challenge nowadays.
Investigated problem. The process of technology transfer and specifically that one of DU 
as a whole is neither simple nor systematic and far from being that perfect, especially when 
it deals with dual-use technologies and at present reduced to a short relationship between 
supplier/recipient only. The experience and practice show that it is a rather complicated, 
multi-leveled and multi-players process which is impacted and follows several factors and 
conditions that determine its success and/or failure at the end. 
The main scientific results. The development of dual use technologies continues in a quag-
mire of conflicting interests and technology transfer export control rationales. There are 
historical, mental and political-military considerations where a state’s decision to develop 
weapon systems or related applications can be assessed not only as a function of perceived 
levels of threat to its security, but also as a need to respond and/or step forward to potential 
technological innovations; and second, the fundamental conceptual differences in apprecia-
tion among countries of the right to possess different advanced weapons systems for defen-
sive or offensive purposes.
The result of this endeavor makes a solid ground floor for further debates in terms of politi-
cal science, export control regulations and factors affecting transfer of sensitive technologies.
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It should be emphasized that in real life they are so interrelated that sometimes it is impos-
sible to clearly determine which group this or another factor belongs to, as well as assess its impact 
on technology transfer and take into account its value and twisting with others. From the point of 
view of an effectiveness of implementation of transfer of dual-use technologies in Ukraine, a deep 
significance and problematic nature of each group differ significantly. The final determinants of 
success are groups of political and mental factors, as they are more mobile in time, meanwhile, le-
gal and technical factors are documented over a fairly long period of time. It is the fixed provisions 
adopted under certain political and mental factors that cause problems with changes in politics and 
mental behavior of society. These changes in Ukraine are rather kaleidoscopic. The technical and 
legal factors affecting technology transfer are developed by the international community and do 
not elicit much comment. They were officially adopted and reflected in the appropriate Ukrainian 
documents, however, their implementation in real life due to a transformation taken in political and 
mental driving forces led to a deep collapse of transfer of dual-use materials science technologies 
in Ukraine. Therefore, a transformation of political and mental factors during the transition of 
Ukraine from the position of a key republic of the Soviet Union into a sovereign “independent” 
European country has to be evaluated.
1. 1. The object of research
To evaluate and clarify four factors :historical, political, technical and mental for an impact 
of transfer of dual use materials science technologies requires to rate and clarify some of ramifica-
tions which are often discussed in the context of non-proliferation debate of military technologies 
and national security. Of importance is also a question if the COVID-19 pandemic will join these 
factors and if it initiates an illicit DU technologies transfer from Ukraine as it was in 1990s and how 
it affects an efficient and proper functioning and optimization of transfer of technologies process, 
and that is quite a challenge nowadays.
1. 2. Problem description
The intricate nature of dual-use technologies and their potential for enhancing Ukrainian 
and other economies make them fundamental to both R&D and inexhaustible political debates. The 
blurring of civilian and defense industrial bases and the increase in issues with uncertain dual-use 
features make distinguishing between civilian and military products and platforms more difficult 
and complicate the issues of export control and technology transfer.
Mechanisms for actual viz. commercial transfer of production technologies of advanced 
materials of dual-use virtually does not exist and there are strong political, economic, security and 
legal reasons. Despite the above a transfer of sensitive technologies and conditions associated with 
it have continued to ignite a huge interest in the last decade worldwide. The process of technology 
transfer as a whole is neither simple nor systematic and far from being perfect as of yet, especially 
when it comes to DU technologies.
Thus, this endeavor makes an effort to analyze and scrutinize four factors and another one 
recently joined – the pandemic, staying between technology supplier/recipient and future prospects 
and real steps forward. The study employs qualitative methodology and is under the umbrella of a 
descriptive research design to agree on historical, technical, political, and mental implications for 
a transfer of sensitive technologies and state’s security. Political, and legal analysis are conduct-
ed in relation to these technologies, actions and questions popped up nowadays associated. This 
descriptive research portrays a rather accurate profile of current situation happened around DU 
technologies in Ukraine. This design offers a profile of described relevant aspects of the problem 
of interest from author’s individual perspective. 
Social and cultural factors (mental, historical) form a lifestyle, work, thinking, consumption 
and significantly impact on all spheres of activity (scientific, political, etc., including technology 
transfer) in a particular country. All this is also aggravated and supplemented by the historical 
factor (country’s evolution), which plays an important role in a sociality and mentality of a society. 
New trends in life, competition, etc. create a new type of thinking for scientists, businessmen, 
politicians, etc. According to the famous physicist M. Born, “science became a matter of national 
importance ... Science became an integral part and the most important part our civilization, and 
scientific activity directly affects the development of civilization”. Various legislative and gov-
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ernmental factors influence a level of existing opportunities and threats of technology transfer. 
National and foreign governments may be its key regulators. This means that the most important 
aspect for technology transfer may be an assessment of state’s political environment. The assess-
ment is carried out by clarifying the political and legal factors affecting technology transfer. There 
are many factors, and even more combinations of those; thus, let’s highlight and list the most com-
mon: the balance of political forces in state, relations between business and government, patent 
law, government regulation, political conditions in foreign countries, government relations with 
foreign states, changes in tax legislation, changes in customs service, etc. Undoubtedly, the suc-
cess of innovation processes in Ukraine mainly exists die to the use of R&D works developed to 
ensure the industrialization and development of defense industry of the former USSR. From the 
very first years of Ukraine’s existence as an independent state - the initial period of transition to a 
global market economy took place, firstly, under the close attention of the world’s community, and 
secondly, in the process of building a competent transition strategy for the CIS countries (where 
Ukraine occupied one of the leading positions in the development of advanced technologies), which 
was attended by professionals of the highest level, who sincerely believed in a prosperity of the 
country and wished it, thirdly, when freedom of speech and publication still reigned in a stream 
of broken democracy. In practice, an implementation of these postulates is a fairly reliable path to 
the economic and spiritual development of a new significant European country. Nevertheless it did 
not happen due to a protracted crisis of the Ukrainian economy and industry, corruption, shadow 
economy, difficulties of formation of new social system, etc. 
The Committee for State Security (KGB) [2] never once during the years of the communist 
regime allowed an analysis of transformation of the highest echelon of power. The Communist 
Party has been overthrown, but a market economy requires an order and a strong state. This is ev-
idenced by economic science, and the “new” cadres, who came to power, trumpet about it. Never-
theless, these cadres are not the second, but rather the third echelon of the same party functionaries 
who were not the best representatives of the school of government brought up by the system of the 
Soviet Communist Party.
This is the starting transformation for the factor 1 – “the highest echelon of power.” Let’s 
move on to the factor 2 – “material component”. All governments of the analyzed period (and it 
should be noted that they changed each other very quickly) declared that Ukraine did not have 
funds to implement a revival program. For a number of reasons, large volumes of emerging private 
capital have so far been sluggishly invested in real production. A role is played by the fact that in a 
large number of cases this new private capital is far from an impeccable origin and is in no hurry 
to emerge from the shadows. It should be noted that, without exception, the countries of economic 
“miracle of revival” received a bunch of foreign investments. During this time, the inflation-de-
stroyed industry suffered fantastic losses due to the severing of cooperative and financial ties with 
parts of the former Soviet Union, nevertheless, so far it physically exists and has not been physi-
cally destroyed (as was the case in Germany and Japan). Thus, the existing flagships of high-tech 
industries (rocket industry, aviation, metallurgy, energy and turbine construction) on a global scale 
are stifled by taxes, a shortage of working capital, a prehistoric system of barter settlements, an 
extremely disenchanted financial system, etc.
The Academy of Sciences of Ukraine had a high and internationally recognized authority 
even against the background of the powerful Academy of Sciences of the USSR, shaping the im-
age of Ukraine as a powerful scientific and technical power in the world, especially in the field 
of materials science. genetics, programming and some other sciences. Its condition is deplorable 
and continues to fall catastrophically. In 2020, the volume of expenditures on the total funding 
of the state budget for the Academy amounted to 4.62 billion UAH [3]. It seems an astronomical 
sum. In practice, this amount provides only two-thirds of minimum needs of the Academy. The 
annual budget for 170 institutions of the National Academy of Science of Ukraine (NASU) makes 
the budget of a well-off American university. Needless to say, for example, that the Max Planck 
Scientific Society in Germany, which annual budget from the state a few years ago arrived at 
8.5 billion euros, or about 255 billion UAH, yet the structure of German Academy of Science is 
similar to NASU. In general, the funding of science and education over the years decreased by at 
least five times, and if to take into account the loss of strong financial support for scientific work 
from industry (contractual works), the overall situation is completely deplorable. This is the initial 
50
No. 3 (74), 2021ScienceRise. Special issue  ISSN 2313-8416
conversion under the factor 2 (financial component). Initial conversion under the factor 3 – “Mar-
ket”. world experience shows that the entire complex pyramid of economic recovery, based on the 
production of high-quality competitive products, is justified only when an appropriate market is 
formed. The aforementioned factors (high technology, qualified personnel, strong and not corrupt-
ed government, etc.) are necessary conditions, and only the presence of the market (and a confi-
dent position in it) is a sufficient condition and is of great importance for future success. Market 
demand, sales, market stability determine the initial transformation of mental factor (sub factor 
4 – “people”). After gaining the independence, Ukraine had the highest rank of scientific and engi-
neering personnel, possessed the most authoritative science in the world, which in the “Wild, Wild 
West” was also considered as one of the most powerful in the world. Perhaps the most clear idea of 
this transformation was formulated in an interview of one of the leading economists of Ukraine, 
Oleg Belorus, who worked for many years in international organizations and reliably knew the 
opinion of the international community: “When I worked at the UN, as the director of the Depart-
ment of Industry, Science and Technology, I was always proud of the fact that according to the UN 
classification, Ukraine was considered a highly developed state, one of the top ten countries in the 
world. Today it is a land of beggars. Absurd!” [4]. This is an emotional assessment; nevertheless, 
it is confirmed in a special report of the UN international commission that studied the situation 
in Russia. Conclusions of the commission, unfortunately, fully relate to Ukraine and convincingly 
show the continuing impoverishment of most of the country’s population, which has caused, in par-
ticular, the emergence of the phenomenon of “new bags” – a stratum of highly educated people. The 
presence of qualified specialists working in spheres vital for human development (science, culture, 
education, health care, high technologies) does not mean an individual perspective of overcoming 
poverty. Over the last decade, the possibilities and potential of domestic science under the project 
of the 1990 model (before the collapse of the Soviet Union) suffered irreparable losses: thousands 
of first-class specialists left to work abroad, tens of thousands left into business, trade and joined 
the army of unemployed. In 2019, 2,270 young scientists worked in scientific institutions of the 
National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, which is 15 % less than in 2018. The number of young 
scientists – candidates of sciences decreased by 5 %. Compared to 2013, these figures are 32 % and 
24 %, respectively [3].
The COVID-19 problem that emerged in 2020 has exacerbated the above problems. Wide-
spread quarantine restrictions and daily reports from the “COVID front” temporarily muffle and 
distract from unpleasant economic news, but they have not gone anywhere: the fever on the stock 
exchanges continues, as does the turbulence of currency quotes and oil prices. All this is evidence 
of the already onset global crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, which is unlike any other. Its 
further consequences are still unpredictable, and therefore, the prospects for economic recovery 
also remain uncertain. Nevertheless, it is already clear that the pandemic has dealt a serious blow 
to the economies of all countries all over the world, for example, the Spanish economy contracted 
by as much as 18.5 % and showed the sharpest quarterly collapse among the EU countries, Portu-
gal – by 14.1 %, France – by 13.1 %. At the same time, the GDP of a number of Baltic and Eastern 
European countries decreased not so much - for example, the GDP of Lithuania showed a decline of 
5.1 %, Latvia – 7.5 %, the Czech Republic – 8.4 % [5]. For France, the 13.1 % drop in GDP recorded 
in the second quarter was a record since the Second World War. Germany, the largest market in 
the Eurozone, was thrown back by the crisis to the level of 2011 (–10.1 % compared to the previous 
quarter). The Italian – to the level of 1990s (–12.4 %) [5].
In July, the heads of the EU countries agreed on a budget for 2021–2027 and approved a 
plan to recover the economy from damage caused by the coronavirus pandemic. The total budget 
amount is a little more than 1 trillion EUR, the cost of the plan is 750 billion EUR. The funds in-
cluded in the recovery plan will be issued to European countries in the form of grants (390 billion 
euros) and loans (360 billion euros). The EU plans to borrow funds for a formation of an “anti-crisis 
fund” on international financial markets – the EU plans to repay these loans no earlier than 2058. 
Along with a reduction in GDP in the Eurozone at the end of this year, the number of corporate 
bankruptcies will significantly increase, analysts at Coface say [6]. For example, in Germany, the 
number of bankruptcies at the end of 2021 will grow by 12 % compared to 2019, and this figure 
is the lowest among European countries. In France, the number of bankruptcies is expected to 
increase by 21 %, in Spain – by 22 %. The most significant increase in the frequency of bankrupt-
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cies is expected in the Netherlands (+36 %) and Italy (+37 %), and all this is only approximate and 
vague. The COVID-19 pandemic is projected to go from 71 million to 100 million people globally 
extremely poor, offsetting previous progress in poverty reduction and the first since 1998 increase 
in extreme poverty worldwide [7]. 
The United Nations conducted over 50 socio-economic studies. It follows from the conclu-
sions of UN experts that since March 2021, 84 percent of Ukrainian families faced a drastic de-
crease in their income, 43 percent – with the loss of a job by at least one of family members. At the 
end of the first half of 2020, the poverty level in Ukraine was 51 % – such an assessment was made 
by the Institute of Demography and Social Research named after Ptukha, NASU and was voiced 
by its director Ella Libanova in an interview with LIGA.net. “This is an estimate based on the latest 
data from the State Statistics Service on income and consumption, which we are monitoring. Now 
this figure is probably higher.” According to her opinion, a poverty level indicator calculated by 
IDSI is based on the “estimated living wage” – and as of mid-2020 it made 3845 Ukrainian hryvnia 
(UAH). At the same time, the “official” minimum, which the Ministry of Social Policy operates 
below, is 2027 UAH [8] Recently, the State Statistics Service released the publication “Self-As-
sessment of Their Income Levels by Households in 2019”. The data were obtained in the course of 
a sample survey of the living conditions of households. According to the State Statistics Service, 
65.3 % considered themselves poor. Another 33.6 % did not consider themselves to be poor, but 
also not to the representatives of the middle class. 1.1 % of citizens consider themselves to be the 
middle class. At the same time, the State Statistics Service [9] could not identify citizens who con-
sider themselves rich. Today one may state that Ukraine is a country of massive and all-embracing 
poverty – a society of a “two-tiered” type, which may serve as a classic illustration of social polar-
ization: 99 % of poor and 1 % of super-rich, a gap among those grows every day. In 2021, a level of 
minimum wage in Ukraine makes 6500 UAH that is only 198 EUR [13]. This key social standard is 
not commensurate with the European level of real income, which Ukrainian neoliberal officials are 
so fond of referring to. The minimum wage in Belgium is now 1626 EUR, in Germany 1610 EUR 
and in France 1555 EUR. However, the level of well-being of Ukrainians is incomparable even with 
the indicators of rather weak European economies. For example, in Greece, ruined by reforms, the 
minimum wage is 758EUR, in Poland – 614 EUR, in Estonia – 584 EUR, in Latvia – 500 EUR, in 
Hungary – 442 EUR, in Romania – 472 EUR, and in Bulgaria – 332 EUR [14].
Verkhovna Rada Vice-Speaker Olena Kondratyuk [10] believes that about 19 million people 
in Ukraine are below a poverty line. In 2020, the poverty rate in Ukraine rose to 50 %. According 
to her, research by international organizations showed that the poverty level in 2020 due to the 
pandemic in Ukraine increased to 50 %. In this regard, she believes that the parliament should 
challenge the government to develop a new strategy for overcoming poverty. “According to many 
international organizations, the poverty level in Ukraine has grown to 50 %, below the poverty line 
is about 19 million of Ukrainians. Therefore, the Verkhovna Rada must challenge the government 
to urgently approve a strategy and a set of measures to combat poverty in Ukraine until 2030 “ 
Kondratyuk said [11].
The aim of research is a quick recap to assess the underpin barriers of transfer of DU tech-
nologies appeared in Ukraine after acquiring the Independence and those developed of today. 
2. Materials and Methods
Mechanisms for actual viz commercial transfer of production technologies of advanced ma-
terials of dual-use virtually do not exist due to a strong political, economic, security and legal rea-
sons. Despite the above a transfer of sensitive technologies and conditions associated with it have 
continued to ignite a huge interest in the last decade worldwide. The process of technology transfer 
as a whole is neither simple nor systematic and far from being perfect as of yet, especially when it 
comes to DU technologies.
Thus, this endeavor makes an effort to analyze and scrutinize four factors plus another one 
recently joined – the COVID pandemic, staying between technology supplier/recipient and future 
prospects and real steps forward. The study employs qualitative methodology and is under the 
umbrella of a descriptive research design to agree on historical, technical, political, and mental 
implications for a transfer of sensitive technologies and state’s security. Political, and legal analysis 
are conducted in relation to these technologies, actions and questions popped up nowadays asso-
52
No. 3 (74), 2021ScienceRise. Special issue  ISSN 2313-8416
ciated. This descriptive research portrays a rather accurate profile of current situation happened 
around DU technologies in Ukraine. This design offers a profile of described relevant aspects of the 
problem of interest from author’s individual perspective
3. Results and discussions
In Ukrainian society, in the process of implementing socio-economic reforms and trans-
forming the existing system of power relations, the political elite periodically changes and ro-
tates with each other, thus, the vector of the ruling elite towards science as a science. the whole 
also changes frequently. And as a result, since the day of independence, the vector of implemen-
tation of state policy in the field of science chosen by Ukraine has brought such a result that, in 
terms of financial support for R&D, neither in absolute terms, nor in dynamics can be compa-
rable with analogues in European countries. Ukraine is the only country that used the period of 
its development not to increase financial allocations for domestic science, but to decrease, the 
dynamics of which amounted to minus 9.3 %. As a result, the loss of qualified scientific person-
nel, a decrease in funding for scientific and scientific and technical work (SSTW). A total num-
ber of employees of research institutes and, most importantly, the number of specialists directly 
involved in SSTW constantly fall. According to the results of development of domestic science 
for 1991–2008 years a total number of scientists decreased 4.4 times in particular 626 Doctors of 
Sciences left Ukraine. During the period of 1996–2008, 1212 Ukrainian candidates of sciences 
have added to their migration biography the fact of a change in their country of residence. The 
number of specialists directly performing SSTW – 4.6 times. The highest rates of decline were 
for 1995 (by 34.8 % of total number of scientists and by 39.1 % of specialists involved in R&D 
in relation to 1991) [12].
There is also a leveling of science priority among other types of activity and a steady decline 
in the level of science-intensive GDP. This index quantitatively reflects the national scale of invest-
ments in R&D, a significant component of which in Ukraine is the state budget. The situation with 
the level of knowledge-intensive GDP can best be described by a term “steep peak” rather than 
“recession”, as at the end of 2018 this indicator (which amounted to 0.62 % of GDP turned out to 
be half as much as in the mid of 1990s, that is, during the period that in the history of independent 
Ukraine was marked as a deep crisis of national economy (with a science-intensive level of 1.4 % 
of GDP). Thus, the level of science-intensive GDP of critical 1990s is still quite a challenge for the 
Ukraine of today. 
For the EU, this indicator in 2015 amounted to 1.96 % of GDP, which is 3.3 times more 
than in Ukraine, in Singapore – 2.2 % (or 3.7 times), in France – 2.27 % (or 3.7 times), Germany – 
2.9 % (or 4.8 times), USA – 2.72 % (or 4.7 times), Finland – 2.87 % (or 4.8 times), Japan – 3.28 % 
(or 5.5 times), Republic of Korea – 4.2 % (or 7 times) [13]. In addition, if to compare with former 
partners in CIS, in terms of high-tech level of GDP, Ukraine is significantly inferior even to some 
of them, for example, the Russian Federation (1.1 %, or 1.8 times, respectively). 
Thus, Ukraine today suffers from a whole range of progressive socio-economic problems: 
impoverishment of population, unemployment, labor migration, and many other crisis symptoms. 
In this regard, it is important to mention the destruction of science as an important component of 
society and the state as a whole, and, consequently, national security. Some ruins remain from a 
society where education and science are constantly neglected, let alone the state and its place on 
the world stage. The innate talent and abilities of a person, not developed by education, perish. 
The outflow of talented young people who do not want to live in the outskirts of civilization suf-
fers avalanche growth [14–16]. This mode of work is critically unfavorable for young scientists 
who en masse move to other fields of activity or emigrate from Ukraine to Europe, America and 
other developed countries. In 2019, 2,270 young scientists worked in scientific institutions of the 
National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, which is 15 % less than in 2018. The number of young 
scientists – candidates of sciences decreased by 5 % if compared to 2013, these figures are 32 % 
and 24 %, respectively [3]. Of course, the results of such an attitude of the state to the problems of 
science were not long in coming. Due to insufficient funding, Ukrainian science is constantly los-
ing its human and material and technical potential. For example, as of January 1, 2016, the number 
of researchers per capita in Ukraine became the lowest in Europe. Its indicator today is not only 
significantly lower than in scientifically developed countries (Japan, France, Germany), but also 
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one and a half times lower than the indicators of Poland and Romania, which until recently were 
much inferior to Ukraine in scientific potential. Commenting on the current situation in Ukrainian 
science, Anatoly Shirokov, head of the NASU Workers’ Union, noted: “In terms of a number of 
scientists per capita, Ukraine is slipping to the level of Albania – where, frankly, there is no de-
veloped science at all. The new version of the law on scientific and S&T activities adopted this 
year is not being implemented – on the contrary, new problems popped up: funding is allocated for 
science less and less, and there has never been such a difficult situation as of today. Ukraine may 
lose science in the very near future: there would simply be no one to do a scientific research.”[17]. 
The opinion of the current president of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Academician of the 
National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine Anatoly Zagorodniy, coincides Shirokov: “Being a sci-
entist in Ukraine is a legitimized way of begging, said my friend, who is a candidate of science and 
a chemist by profession. After seven years at the research institute, he went to work for pharmacists 
with a salary of two thousand dollars. Do you agree with the thesis of legitimized begging?” [3] As 
for the salary in Academy of Science then, its basic level depends on a position, scientific degree 
and title, experience and allowances provided by the law. Accounting for all this a junior researcher 
on full employment receives from 213 to 274 euro, a researcher – from 228 to 304 EUR, a senior 
researcher – 274 to 456 EUR, a leading researcher – 304 to 548 EUR, chief researcher, head of 
department – 304 to 608 EUR. The salaries of academics and corresponding members, as well as 
all other researchers, are determined by a position and allowances. In addition to the salary, they 
receive lifelong salaries for academic titles: an academician about 5 thousand UAH per month, a 
corresponding member – 103 EUR. The size of these tuition fees has not been reviewed by the 
government since 2007. 
The COVID pandemic has made a huge contribution to all of the above said factors. “The 
efforts that we make urgently now are designed to soften a blow of the pandemic and set Ukraine 
up for a post-crisis revival,” said UNDP representative Dafina Gercheva: “We hope that after the 
pandemic, the country will be stronger and more stable than ever before.” [18]. Meanwhile hun-
dreds of scientists still leave the country looking for a better life and taking their knowledge and 
technologies.
The result of this effort makes a floor for further debates in terms of political science, export 
control regulations and factors affecting transfer of sensitive technologies worldwide.
4. Conclusions
The above-discussed groups and subgroups of four factors affecting the transfer of dual-use 
technologies are closely interrelated and possess a profound significance. Each step towards prac-
tice and optimization of transfer of materials science technologies in Ukraine should be carried 
out accounting for all groups, as well as specifics of high level of science intensity of advanced 
technologies for which, a stable market demand always exists. Unfortunately, Ukraine does not 
used the period of its formation as a sovereign European country yet not to increase budgetary 
financial allocations for national science, but to reduce those. This historical factor leads to a cat-
astrophic change in mental factor. As a result, there is a steady fall of science importance among 
other activities in society, a decrease in science-intensive GDP and a super-catastrophic brain drain 
among young scientists both abroad and into other activities. The COVID pandemic has made a 
huge contribution to all of the above said factors when raised the poverty and uncertainty in the 
global community. Every COVID-19 affected nation [19] has felt a huge gap between rich and poor. 
Therefore, the search for ways to effectively overcome the problems associated with the newly 
appeared factor “pandemic” should be based primarily on a deep analysis of all socio-political, 
economic and historical processes that manifest themselves against the pandemic and to account 
for an interdependence and synergistic effects of those, thou.
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